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Published
November 19, 2026

Colombia's Mining comeback is defined territory by territory

Colombia’s mining sector is attracting renewed investment, but national reforms alone are not enough. Environmental permits, illegal mining, community consultation and local dynamics will determine success, making territorial understanding and social licence essential for mining companies.

Colombia’s mining sector is attracting renewed investment, but national reforms alone are not enough. Environmental permits, illegal mining, community consultation and local dynamics will determine success, making territorial understanding and social licence essential for mining companies.

Colombia is back on the mining map. Since President Abelardo De la Espriella took office in August, his government has repealed 10 resolutions that delimited the "Special Mining Districts for Productive Diversification", which it argues had held back exploration and investment. The move is part of an effort to reverse restrictions inherited from the Petro administration. The signal landed in a country where about 97% of the territory has never been explored, along the Andean belt that hosts some of the world's largest copper deposits, and where years of projects had been delayed by regulatory uncertainty.

Investors have responded. AngloGold Ashanti plans about $2.5 billion for the Quebradona copper project in Antioquia, conditional on environmental permits. Collective Mining says it plans to invest $100 million in 2027 in Caldas, and Colombia's vice president said it could invest up to $1 billion more through 2030 if it secures the required license. Mineros has reaffirmed its commitment. Zijin Mining and OP Gold Capital are among the companies that received new exploration contracts. Denarius agreed an equity investment in Copper Giant's Mocoa project, alongside an offtake agreement with Trafigura.

From announcement to reality

But how does this translate into reality? Repealing the resolutions does not authorize mining by itself. Companies still need environmental permits and must meet land-use requirements, and the largest figures remain conditional on them. So far in 2026, only about $224 million of foreign direct investment has actually reached the sector.

The deeper obstacle is one that national announcements cannot remove: in Colombia, social licence is decided territory by territory. In southern Bolívar, the governor says only 5% of gold mining is legal. In Antioquia, authorities froze new mining permits across six municipalities for three years, whatever the national repeals say.

No two territories are the same

For a mining project, there is no "Colombia", only the specific territory where it sits. In some places, armed groups control movement, local economies and even who is allowed to speak for the community. In others, illegal mining is already embedded, shaping livelihoods and local power, and changing how neighbors see a formal company. Elsewhere, communities have long histories with mining, or with its absence, and very different expectations of the state and of private investors.

This is the legacy of decades of armed conflict. Even after the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, dissident factions persist alongside the ELN and the Clan del Golfo, and they compete for illicit revenues such as illegal mining. The latest UNODC and government survey found 118,410 hectares with evidence of alluvial gold mining in 2025 (gold recovered from riverbeds), up 4.5% on the year before. About 75% of that activity is illegal, 21% has technical or environmental permits, and 4% is in the process of becoming legal. Nearly half (49%) takes place in areas where mining is not permitted, such as forest reserves and national parks, and 48% overlaps with coca crops. Much of the increase was on Afro-Colombian collective lands, and activity was also detected in 30 Indigenous reserves.

The same company, with the same project and the same promises, can be received very differently from one municipality to the next. An engagement plan that works in one place can fail in the next. Zijin has said that illegal miners who sell gold to the Clan del Golfo are seriously affecting production at its Buriticá project, an example of what can happen when the reality of a territory is underestimated.

The consulta previa test

The consulta previa, the right of ethnic communities to be consulted on projects in their territories, shows the same gap between national policy and local reality. The government has promised to respect it, but also to speed it up. In October, Presidential Directive 06 of 2026 removed the proportionality test and changed how consultations that end without agreement are closed. Yet a faster national procedure does not create agreement on the ground. Communities and the Ombudsman's office have warned that a shorter process could weaken the right, and a company that treats it as a box to tick may pay for it later.

Conclusion

Companies need to go beyond risk analysis

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Standard country-level risk analysis is necessary, but it is no longer sufficient. Companies need to go further and carry out a micro-territory analysis for each project area. Who really holds influence there: the state, armed groups, community leaders, informal miners, local government? How does illegal mining shape the local economy and social fabric? What do communities expect, fear and remember, and whom do they trust? Which ethnic communities are present, and how will the consulta previa work in practice? And where do regional rules, such as Antioquia's three-year permit freeze, diverge from national policy?

In this context, human rights in Colombia cannot be handled as standard due diligence. Where armed groups tax or control parts of the mining economy, and where communities live with the consequences of conflict, companies need heightened human rights due diligence. That means looking closely at how their security arrangements, contractors, payments, relationships with informal miners and supply chains could cause, contribute to or be linked to abuses, and repeating that assessment throughout the life of the project, not once before it starts.

The national signal is positive and the pipeline is real, but expect years, not months, between announcement and production. The companies that succeed will be those that treat each territory as its own case, and build their social licence place by place rather than relying on one national playbook.

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